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Faculdad de Ciencias Sociales y Juridicas, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid,
c\. Madrid, 28903 Getafe, Madrid, Spain
This paper challenges the widely held view that tariff protection was the
major factor in explaining the poor performance of Spanish agriculture in
the half century prior to the 1936 Civil War. After examining the general
level of tariffs, it is argued that these were not sufficient in themselves to
explain either the poor diets or weak demand for manufactured goods.
Secondly, fanners were slow to switch resources out of cereals, not so
much because of the tariffs, but rather because of the limited export
opportunities for alternative crops, especially olive oil and wine. Finally,
the evidence suggests that those areas which saw a significant increase in
the area of cereals were just as likely to see a decline in the agricultural
population as those that did not, suggesting that the rural exodus was
determined by factors other than the tariff.
1. Introduction
Agriculture is often blamed for the poor performance of the Spanish economy
in the half century or so prior to the 1936-9 Civil War.1 Crop yields were
some of Europe's lowest, and output per male labourer was just 39 per cent of
that in the United Kingdom in 1930, 44 per cent of that in France, or 38 per
cent of that in Germany.2 Working capital was minimal, as reflected in the
widespread use of the traditional 'roman' scratch plough, the low chemical
fertilizer usage, and the low ratios of animal power per hectare.3 The cause of
agriculture's poor performance is much debated, but perhaps the most fre-
quent explanation is tariff protection, especially that which cereal producers
enjoyed. Thus Tortella, after posing the question of why the transition from
See, for example, Maluquer de Motes 1987, p. 75, Nadal 1973, pp. 553-67, Tortella
1987^  PP- 55-9 and 1994b, p. 8.
For yields, see Tortella 1994a, Table 5 and Simpson 1995a, Table 12.1; for labour
productivity, O'Brien and Prados de la Escosura 1992, Table 6. Female agricultural
labour is ignored because of measurement difficulties.
However, that does not imply there was no change, as illustrated in, for example, Gallego
1986.
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'traditional to modern agriculture' was so slow, answers categorically: 'There
is a simple answer: protectionism'.4
In this article I look at three areas where agricultural protection is usually
considered as having had a negative effect on economic development. In
Section 2, I argue that bread prices were not significantly above those of
other more developed European countries where farmers also enjoyed
protection. Furthermore, if diets were poor, they were not significantly more
so than in other Mediterranean countries. In Section 3 I show that there
were few alternatives to cereals given the limited opportunities for expand-
ing wine and olive oil output. Furthermore, the poor pastures found over
much of the country made intensive livestock difficult. In the final section I
argue that, at least prior to the first decade of the twentieth century, tariffs
had only a weak impact in retaining labour in the sector. After this date,
farm labour was just as likely to migrate from areas which saw a significant
increase in the area of cereals (Castilla-Leon) as it was to remain (the
South). I conclude that the direct contribution of cereal protection in
explaining the low productivity of the sector was probably much less than is
usually thought by economic historians.
2. Protection and the Spanish consumer
... the higher the level of GNP per capita in 1913 or 1929, the lower the
nominal protection of agriculture. It seems that the lower-income
countries of Eastern and Southern Europe gave heavy protection to both
agriculture and manufacturing.5
The Spanish economy saw some major changes in the half century or so
prior to the Civil War. In particular, Prados de la Escosura has estimated
that GDP per head exactly doubled between 1859-61 and I933-35-6 This
increase in GDP was accompanied by structural changes, with a growth in
urbanization and a decline in agricultural employment. But there can be
little doubt that Spain was still a poor country in 1936, both in absolute
terms, and in comparison with other western European countries. Thus,
real GDP per capita in 1929 was only 68 per cent of that in Italy, 40 per cent
of that in Great Britain, 46 per cent of that in France and 57 per cent of that
in Germany.7 In addition, Palafox has identified other indicators - per capita
consumption of cotton and energy, numbers of letters or telegrams sent, and
literacy, where Spain once more performs noticeably worse than the
continent's leading economies.8
4
 Tortella, 1987, pp. 51-2 and 1994b, p. 58. In fact Tortella also gives considerable weight
to the question of natural resources, see 1994b, pp. 6-10.
s
 Emphasis in the original. Lindert 1989, p. 12.
6
 This is equivalent to an annual increase of 0.94 per cent. Carreras (1989) gives a more modest
growth of 59 per cent, or an annual 0.65 per cent. Prados de la Escosura 1993, Table D2.
7
 Prados de la Escosura 1992, p. 36.
8
 Palafox 1991, p. 25. For literacy, see also Nunez 1992, ch. 2.
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Table 1 provides another indicator, this time for a wider selection of
countries, and concentrating on an area which most interests us here, namely
the relative cost of food in Spain. An hour's work in Spanish cities purchased
significantly less than it did in other western Europe countries, with the
exception of Italy. Of the other leading European nations, only in France did
the low purchasing power of its citizens appear to have approached the level
of that in Spain and Italy, although basic foods were relatively cheaper.9
Table 1. Relative purchasing power of building workers in Europe, 1930.
(The quantity that wages from one hour's labour could buy in major cities, in kilos
and litres).
Spain (4)
Italy (7)
France (4)
Germany (6)
Britain (7)
Austria (3)
Ireland (3)
Low Countries (4)
Denmark (1)
Sweden (3)
Estonia (2)
Poland (4)
Czechosvkia (3)
Bread
1.79
1.48
2.34
3-io
3.40
2.05
2.79
2.93
2.41
2.37
1.94
3.00
3-25
Potatoes
3-93
3-73
6.04
11.82
8.68
6.58
13.11
13.67
12.50
15.83
6.60
12.27
12.21
Meat
0.27
0.25
0.29
0.50
0.71
0.36
0.64
0.53
1.14
0.89
0.36
0.39
0.55
Milk
1.79
2.19
2-53
4.48
2.85
2-55
3.28
4.56
6.06
8.64
2.20
2.81
3-77
Sugar
0.73
0.43
1.07
2.10
2.71
1.23
2.43
1.74
4.00
4.52
0.94
0.83
1.30
Note: Building workers wages have been taken as an average between skilled (albaniles) and
unskilled (peones) in the leading urban centres, the number of which are given after each
country. Bread is from wheat flour, except in the case of Austria, Estonia, Germany and
Poland, when rye bread has been used; meat refers to an average of beef, lamb, pork and veal,
except when information is lacking, namely Denmark (lamb), Britain (veal), Ireland (pork
and veal) and Sweden (pork). Figures in parentheses refer to the number of urban centres.
Source: Direction General de Trabajo, 1931, cuadros lxiii y lxiv, which in turn is based on
International Labour Office publications. Information refers to January 1930.
What the Table cannot inform us of course is to what extent the low
purchasing power of Spanish urban workers was a reflection of expensive
food, and to what extent low wages. But the question of why diets in Spain
were so poor in the 1930s cannot be simply a question of the level of
economic development. Table 2 shows for example that the Irish consumed
23 per cent more calories per individual, 95 per cent more meat, and 228 per
9
 In comparison with Spain, French hourly building wages could purchase 31 per cent
more for white bread or 54 per cent for potatoes. For an international study of living
standards using this source, see Williamson 1995.
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cent more sugar3 even though per capita income in the two countries was not
very different. However, Table 2 also shows that the low calorie intake, and
shortage of animal protein, was a feature of the Mediterranean diet in
general, rather than just that of the Spanish. In the rest of this section, I
outline first, the major characteristics of cereal protection in Spain and
second, whether tariff protection was sufficiently high to explain the
differences noted in Tables 1 and 2.
As Sanchez Albornoz has shown, from 1820 government policy success-
fully reserved the internal and colonial markets for domestic cereal
producers.10 However, by the 1880s the impact of falling production costs in
the newly settled temperate countries and the decline in rail and sea freight,
threatened to dislodge Spanish wheat farmers from their traditional markets
of the periphery (Barcelona, Valencia etc.). Competition was restored by a
combination of a depreciating peseta, and an increase in import duties.11
Thus the tariff of 4.54 pesetas/100 kilos was increased to 8 pesetas in
December 1891, and again to 10.5 pesetas in February 1895. It then tended
to fall, but with higher levels becoming operational if the domestic wheat
price fell below certain levels.12 The first World War saw an extension of
government intervention, with attempts to fix maximum and minimum
prices.13 By the end of the War, Spain had become virtually self sufficient in
wheat and the tariff was supplemented from November 1921 by strict
import quotas, which were accompanied by maximum and minimum
domestic prices. In only three years between 1922 and 1935 did imports rise
above 5 per cent of the national harvest (1928, 1929 and 1932), being
negligible in the rest.14 Despite the dubious success in becoming self-
sufficient in wheat and stabilizing consumer prices, the clamour for still
greater protection, and reports of distress amongst thousands of wheat
farmers during the 1920s, questions this as a suitable policy measure, a
point examined elsewhere.15
If from the late nineteenth century Spain was not alone in protecting its
wheat growers, levels were considered exceptionally high, and helped
produce some of Europe's highest bread prices. To compare the real level of
protection between countries is notoriously difficult, given the variety of
methods that protection might take, problems in converting currencies, and
10
 Sanchez-AlbornoZj 1963. See also Nadal 1985, pp. 93-4.
11
 See especially Grupo de Estudios de Historic/, Rural (hereafter GEHR), 1980.
12
 See El Progreso Agricolay Pecuario (EPAPM), abril 1928, no. 1529, pp. 257-60.
13
 The royal decree of August 1914 allowed, briefly, imported wheat to enter duty free if
prices remained above 29 pesetas per 100 kilos. This was reintroduced between March
and June, and November of 1915. Finally, the decree of January 1916 established duty
free imports until April 1921. Maximum and minimum prices for wheat were introduced
in November 1915.
14
 Montojo Sureda, 1945. See also Pinilla Navarro, 1992, pp. 418-20.
15
 See Simpson 1995a, pp. 222-31.
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the significant dietary variations. Comparing tariff levels alone is not enough
(column i, Table 3).16 For example, Spain supplemented its tariffs from
Table 3. Indices of wheat protection and self-sufficiency in
five European importing nations, 1925-9.
Percentages
Spain
France
Germany*
Italy
Gt. Britain
(1)
19.6
23.0
29.0
27.0
—
(2)
96.9
86.2
83.9
74.0
21.2
(3)
19.2
7.8
8.0
5.6
9.2
Notes and Sources:
(1) Duties on imported wheat in 1927, Liepmann (1938).
(2) Level of self-sufficiency in wheat. * Includes both wheat and
rye. The level of wheat self-sufficiency was 61.3% and rye 99.7%.
Source: International Institute of Agriculture, various years.
(3) Income from customs receipts as a percentage of total imports.
Refers to period 1922-30. Tena (1992), p. 333.
November 1921 with import quotas for wheat and maize and, therefore, in
the words of Liepmann, 'Spain's corn duties . . . had only limited practical
value for judging her corn-import policy, and the large decreases of her corn
imports in post-War periods'. A better reflection of the protection that
Spanish farmers enjoyed is in column 2, which shows the country to have
been virtually self-sufficient in wheat in comparison to other countries.17 If
Spanish wheat producers had been competitive in international markets,
then domestic self-sufficiency would not be a good indicator of protection.
But Spain was not competitive, achieving yields that were little different to
those in the United States, but requiring considerably more labour.18
Finally, column 3 indicates the generally higher level of protection in Spain
across both agriculture and industry compared to other European
nations.19
Domestic self-sufficiency in wheat was achieved at a cost to the con-
sumer, as domestic prices remained above international ones. Figure 1
compares the internal wheat price in Spain with the English price, which is
taken as the 'world price', and has been converted into pesetas at the current
16
 Liepmann, 1938, p. 101. For Spanish tariff policy see EPAPM 1928, pp. 257-60 and
Montojo Sureda 1945, pp. 15-47.
17
 The I.I.A. does not allow a figure for 1909-13 to be calculated as production figures refer
to post first World War boundaries, whilst imports to those before the War.
18
 Spain had 8.9 hectares of land per male worker in 1930, against 48.7 hectares in the
United States. O'Brien and Prados de la Escosura 1992, Table 5.
19
 For a general study of tariffs in this period, see especially Tena, forthcoming.
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exchange rate.20 Whereas between 1870-77 Spanish wheat prices were
cheaper than 'world' prices, this would not be the case for the rest of the
period. Only during the first World War, when British prices rose on
account of shipping difficulties, did the price difference fall much below 20
per cent.
Other countries, such as France or Germany, also protected their farmers,
so Spain was not alone. In the case of France, Lindert has shown that the
silver price of wheat grew from being 5 per cent higher than in England
during the 1870s, to around 26 or 27 per cent by the 1890s and 1900s. In
other words, not so very different from the Spanish experience.21 Lindert
also reminds us that the English Corn Laws kept the domestic price of wheat
from around 1710 to 1846 significantly above that of other European
countries. Indeed, the gap between Britain and other countries in this earlier
period appears remarkably similar to that identified in Figure 1, between
Spain and the 'world price'.22 It seems unlikely that higher bread prices
caused by tariff protection could make a really significant difference to
household budgets in Spain in the period 1891-1936.23 However, even if
160
1870 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930
Figure I. Spanish wheat prices as a percentage of 'world' prices.
Note: Figures given as 3 year averages.
Sources: For prices, Mitchell and Deane 1962, GEHR 1980 and Paris Eguilaz
1943. Exchange rates, Carreras (ed.), 1989, pp. 390-1.
20
 As much of wheat consumed in Britain was imported, there is no need to include freight
in the calculation. Unlike GEHR, 1980, who showed the costs (and profits) of shipping
from England to Barcelona, our interest here is simply to illustrate the price 'gap'
between the two countries. A moving three year price average is used. For a wider
comparison of international wheat prices between 1880 and 1905, see Palafox 1991,
cuadro 1.3.
21
 Lindert 1991, Table 2.4.
22
 Ibid. Table 2.4.
23
 Fraile 1993.
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cereal protection in Spain was not significantly above that of its neighbours,
the low incomes of the country implied that its relative impact on aggregate
demand was greater than in, say, Germany or France. Bread inevitably had a
greater weight in the family budget of the lower income countries of the
Mediterranean.
3. Tariffs and the allocation of resources within agriculture
It follows that the best policy for European countries during the Great
Depression was to carry out a shift from crop production to livestock.
Countries which were able and far-sighted enough to do this stood a
much better chance of overcoming the crisis that those which, in the face
of the new trends, persevered with former habits.24
Peter Lindert has stressed that governments in recent decades frequently
distort their economies by anti-trade policies, as governments 'tend to tax
exportable-good agriculture and protect import-competing agriculture'.25 In
this respect Spain does not appear to have been very different. Spanish
producers of oranges, olive oil, olives, wine, grapes, raisins, soft fruits,
nuts and early vegetables all suffered to some degree as they had to pay
higher prices for wheat, meat, rice, sugar, machinery and consumer goods
because of import duties. Whilst it is true that most export crops were
themselves protected from imports in the domestic market, it seems un-
likely that they would have faced any serious competition without this
protection.26
It has often been argued that the high concentration of resources in
cereals was a major cause of Spanish agriculture's low productivity. There-
fore in circa 1910, cereals and legumes made up 34.7 per cent of Spain's
agricultural final output, but only 23 per cent in France, 22 per cent in Italy,
19 per cent in Germany and 12 per cent in the United Kingdom.27 To
consider whether tariffs delayed the switch out of cereals and into other
crops, I shall consider the problem from two angles, namely the question of
lost export opportunities and, as suggested by Tracy's quote above, the
delay in transferring resources to livestock farming. I argue that, rather than
a misguided tariff policy, it was lack of alternative crops to cereals, in
contrast to elsewhere in western Europe, that was the principal obstacle to
change.
24
 Tracy 1989, p. 19.
25
 Linden 1991, p. 29.
26
 One important exception is the question of substitutes. In this respect wine producers
benefited from taxes on imported alcohol, which was often used as a base for the
production of other drinks, and olive oil producers from taxes on imports of edible
vegetable oils.
27
 O'Brien and Prados de la Escosura 1992, Table 3. Output is valued in national
currencies.
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In 19353 87.3 per cent of Spain's wheat production was produced using
dry farming techniques, 10.2 per cent using irrigation, and just 2.4 per cent
under conditions which would be considered as normal in northern
Europe.28 In the absence of irrigation, the major alternative crops to cereals
in Spain were vines and olives. By the early twentieth century increased
domestic demand depended mainly on population growth, with per capita
consumption growing by just 8.3 per cent in the case of olive oil, and falling
by 1.4 per cent for wine, between 1897-1901 and 1929-33.29 Both crops had
important export markets, and it is here that we shall look for lost
opportunities because of the protection which cereal farming enjoyed.
The vine was Spain's major export crop throughout the period.30 The
intensive nature of viticulture made it well suited to the small family farms of
the Mediterranean area, and the lack of capital often associated with peasant
farming was alleviated in the pre-phylloxera period by the fact that off-farm
inputs were minimal. Low entry costs and extensive areas of suitable land for
its cultivation were offset only by the bulky nature of the product, and its
perishability, as most wines in their natural state frequently became
undrinkable within a few months of production. The railways helped lift the
geographic restrictions on production, and the addition of alcohol to the
wine greatly increased the product's life.
Spanish exports grew rapidly from the early 1870s on account of the
severely diminished harvests in France, caused by phylloxera (Table 4). The
increase in wine prices encouraged a switch away from marginal cereals and
pasture, with the area of vines increasing from perhaps 1.5 m. hectares in
i860 to about 2.0 m. in the mid 1880s.31 However, the boom was short lived.
By the turn of the twentieth century, replanting with disease resistant
varieties had allowed French domestic output to recover, and it was the turn
for Spanish producers to suffer the widespread destruction by phylloxera.
Without the benefit of an abnormal short-fall in a major producing country,
Spanish growers needed either to increase market share, or to extend the size
of the market. They failed to do either, and the country's share of the world
trade in wine slipped from approximately half in the 1880s to less than a
quarter by 1925-29.
Spanish exports were severely limited because France, by far the biggest
wine market with 62 per cent of world imports in 1925-29, established
preferential trade agreements with Algeria. Furthermore, if every producer
28
 Ministerio de Agricukura, 1936, p. 8. Only in the north of the country (Galicia, Asturias3
Santander, Guipuzcoa and Vizcaya) was it possible to crop annually without irrigation.
Dry farming implied that land was left fallow at least once every two years.
29
 Simpson 1989, cuadro 5.
30
 At its peak in 1880-4, 45 per cent of all exports were products of the vine (Prados de la
Escosura 1982, p. 41).
31
 For the difficulties in measuring the area of vines, see especially Pan-Montojo 1994, pp.
384-93 and Simpson 1996, pp. 224-7.
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Table
1861-65
1866-70
1871-75
1876-80
1881-85
1886-90
1891-95
1896-1900
1901-05
1906-10
1911-15
1916-20
1921-25
4. Exports
Total
exports
88.7
111.5
160.6
302.4
682.7
825.6
636.4
534-6
208.4
140.1
269.9
445-5
278.6
of Spanish
Exports
to
France
9-9
13.0
30.8
180.1
547-9
698.0
444-5
372.0
143-3
42.7
141.8
275-7
166.2
bulk wines.
Exports
to other
countries
78.8
98.5
129.8
122.2
134.8
127.6
I9I-9
162.6
65.1
97-4
128.1
169.8
112.4
% t o
France
11
12
19
60
80
85
70
70
69
30
53
62,
60
Spanish
wine
price
23.2
19.4
20.2
26.0
35-5
26.0
16.5
19.3
20.7
15.8
27.4
30.4
23.2
Index
Exports
by value
100
105
158
382
1178
1043
510
501
210
108
359
658
314
Notes: Exports in millions of litres. Wine price refers to San Pere de Ribes (Barcelona).
Index of exports obtained by multiplying total exports by wine price; 1861-65 = I 0 ° -
Source: Estadistica (s) de Comercio Exterior and Balcells 1980, pp. 375-9.
country restricted imports to protect domestic growers, non-producers also
frequently placed high tariffs on wines to protect other domestically pro-
duced alcoholic drinks, severely reducing the market for cheap table wines
outside France. Even if Spanish growers had managed to improve product
quality and establish brand names, which some did, it is unlikely that they
would have widened the market significantly.32
On the supply side, if producers appear to have responded quickly to an
outward movement of the demand curve in the 1870s and 1880s, they found
it less easy to reduce output in periods of depressed demand, as taking vines
out of production implied the destruction of costly assets. However, there
appear to have been other factors which strictly limited long term profits in
viticulture, as wine producers in the pre-phylloxera period experienced
conditions not dissimilar to those faced by tropical agricultural producers at
this time, namely low entry costs and elastic supplies of land and labour.33
Phylloxera raised entry costs by demanding greater inputs of skilled labour
and capital, but much of the world's over-production of wine during the first
third of the twentieth century stemmed from the extension of vines in
regions such as central Spain and Algeria, where the crop's opportunity
32
 In France, for example, the exports of quality wines declined from roughly 60 per cent of
production of vins de cm in 1869-77, to 30 per cent in 1913, and 10 per cent in 1939.
Warner i960, p. 85.
33
 For tropical producers, see Lewis 1978, especially chapter 7.
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costs were low, labour cheap and phylloxera's presence minimal.34 Fur-
thermore, as alcohol produced from grapes was more expensive than that
produced from other sources, product adulteration remained a major
problem, especially when wine prices showed a tendency to rise. Finally, as
illustrated in Figure 2, with the brief exception of the period surrounding the
first World War, there was no long term price incentive for cereal farmers to
switch to viticulture. This is reflected in the fact that the contribution of the
viticulture to agricultural output, far from growing, actually declined from
12 per cent in 1891-95 to 8 per cent in 1929-33.35
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Figure 2. Long run changes in relative prices of wheat> wine and olive
oil.
Sources: Carreras (ed.), 1989, pp. 115-16 and Balcells 1980, pp. 376-8. Wheat
prices for 1907-12 have been taken as an average of the September price in
Valladolid and Barcelona (Anuario estadistico 1920, pp. 190-1 and 1934, pp.
258-9). Olive oil prices for 1908 and 1909 are the average for Barcelona {Anuario
estadistico 1920, pp. 190-1).
The olive was another crop of major importance both for the domestic
and external market, with about a fifth of total output exported in the
decade prior to the Civil War. Between 1901-12 and 1926-35, the area
under olives grew by a third, agricultural yields increased by 28 per cent, but
34
 Opportunity costs are difficult to measure, although for La Mancha (Albacete, Ciudad
Real, Cuenca and Toledo) wheat yields averaged only 0.6 tons per hectare in 1909-14
(Torres 1944, pp. 247-72), against a national average of 0.9 in Spain, 0.7 in Algeria, 1.1
in Italy, 1.3 in France and 2.2 in the British Isles (calculated from Malenbaum 1953, pp.
236-9). Lewis notes a figure of 7001b per acre (0.8 tons per hectare) for tropical
countries in 1900 (1978, p. 188). In some regions of Algeria and central Spain, phylloxera
was still absent in the 1920s.
35
 Simpson 1995b, appendix id.
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industrial yields in the manufacture of olive oil saw virtually no change.
These movements in productivity are deceptive however, for whilst an
important part of the increase in agricultural yields appears to have been
achieved by simply having a greater proportion of the nation's trees in full
production, and by farmers increasing annual variable costs to take advan-
tage of favourable prices (extra ploughings, hoeings, greater care in harvest-
ing, etc.)j the most significant change in this sector during the period was
without doubt the modernization of the olive mills and presses.
In the nineteenth century, most Spanish olive oil exported was of poor
quality, and used for industrial purposes, namely lighting, as a raw material
in the manufacture of soap, and as a lubricant for machinery. The growth of
other cheaper vegetable substitutes implied that, to retain markets, pro-
ducers had to improve product quality, switching from the industrial to the
edible oil market, which in turn required considerable investment in new
plant. From a low of 16.7 thousand tons of olive oil exported in the decade
1886-95, exports grew to 74.4 thousand tons in 1926-35. However, the six
major markets for Spanish olive oil between 1865 and 1935, namely Italy,
France, Cuba, Argentina, United States and Great Britain, illustrate once
again the limitations of the export market for Spanish producers, as five of
the six countries were either Mediterranean countries (and therefore pro-
ducers themselves), or had large Mediterranean immigrant populations.
Market size was therefore limited by taste and cultural experiences.36
Olive oil processing required a cash investment which could not be easily
substituted by labour and which, by allowing economies of scale, gave the
larger producer an advantage over the smaller one. This led to a greater
concentration of production as small producers sold their fruit to the larger
manufacturer.37 However, although the technical change in manufacturing
increased product quality and opened up new markets, the greater part of
the value added was obtained in the growing and harvesting of the crop.
Government estimates in 1921 suggest that only 10 per cent of the price of
olive oil could be attributed to the manufacturing process.38 Therefore 90
per cent of the cost of olive oil was based on the use of extensive areas of
relatively unfertile soil, and some of Europe's cheapest casual agricultural
labour.
As with the viticulture, Spanish olive oil producers found increasing
competition from other cheap cost producers in the Mediterranean, and by
1929-33 Greece, Tunisia and Algeria had captured a third of international
trade.39 However, competition from countries with labour cheaper than
Spain's was only part of the problem. The difficulties in mechanizing olive
36
 The sixth country, Britain, was of declining importance from the late nineteenth century
as cheaper vegetable oils were used for industrial purposes.
37
 For the example of the company Carbonell in Cordoba, Zambrana 1987, chapter 4.
38
 Direction General de Agriculturay Montes, 1923.
39
 Zambrana 1987, p. 296.
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growing, especially the harvest, led to growers facing competition either
directly from other, cheaper vegetable oils, or indirectly through the mixing
of them with olive oil. This played an important part in depressing prices,
and limited the switch of land away from cereals into olives. As a result, if
cereals and legumes accounted for 62 per cent of arable land, and 55 per
cent of crop output in 1891-5, the area remained unchanged at 62 per cent
in 1931, although output fell slightly to 45 per cent.40
As suggested by Tracy, a major factor in productivity growth in northern
Europe's agriculture from the late nineteenth century was the movement of
resources away from the production of bread cereals, where demand tended
to be stagnant and producers faced growing international competition, and
into livestock products. Thus in Great Britain the area devoted to wheat fell
by a half and the number of cattle increased by 30 per cent between 1870
and 1910. In France, whilst the value of cereals stagnated, the output of
meat and dairy produce increased by 48 per cent between 1865-74 and
1905-14. In Italy, the number of cattle increased by 40 per cent between
1880 and 1910, and there were significant increases in the numbers of pigs,
sheep and goats.41 If in Germany there was no fall in the area of wheat and
rye, the number of cattle rose by a third between 1873 and 1913.42 In Spain,
the situation is harder to establish on account of the lack of reliable censuses,
and the problem of calculating suitable production coefficients. In general,
however, livestock numbers do not appear so very different in 1929 as they
were in 1917 or 1865.43 By contrast, the area of wheat grew throughout most
of the nineteenth century, and increased by 24 per cent and production by
34 per cent between 1905-9 and 1930-4.
There can be few doubts that this failure to switch resources out of bread
grains and into meat and dairy produce was a major cause of the low
productivity in the agricultural sector in Spain. That said, it is much more
difficult to establish to what extent the failure was the result of tariffs, and to
what extent other factors should be blamed.
The question however, is not one of free trade or protection for cereals, as
Spanish livestock producers also enjoyed strict controls on imports. Popu-
lation growth, improvements in per capita incomes, real wages and growing
urbanization over the period 1865-1936 might be expected to have pro-
duced an increase in demand for livestock produce. The virtual stagnation
in herd size as shown in the censuses of 1865, 1917 and 1933 suggests,
40
 GEHR 1983a, pp. 243-4. Fallow land has been excluded.
41
 The number of pigs increased by 28 per cent, sheep by 40 per cent and goats by 36 per
cent, Mitchell 1992, pp. 347-8.
42
 Statistical Abstract for the United Kingdom, Toutain 1961, Statistisches Jahrbuch fur das
Deutsche Recish, all cited in Tracy, 1989 pp. 51, 76 and 100-1.
43
 Taking the herd size (live weight) to have been 100 in 1865, it was 98 in 1750, 87 in 1917
and 105 in 1929. Garrabou and Sanz (1985) cuadro 20 and GEHR (1978) apendice. See
also Simpson, 1995a, p. 180.
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however, that per capita supply fell. If demand for meat was indeed rising
faster than supply, then prices would be expected to be rising against those
of bread. Figure 3 shows that this indeed was the case in Madrid from the
mid i88os, with growth being especially strong after the first World War.
The trend for Paris, although moving in the same direction, was less
attractive to livestock producers. In response to these changes in prices,
Spanish farmers started to switch resources away from bread grains and into
feed. As early as 1926, Flores de Lemus had noted the growing importance
of feed grains compared to bread, and suggested that this was the only
feasible alternative for cereal farmers, given the stagnation in domestic
demand and the impossibility of exporting wheat.44 The government also
reacted to rising meat prices by allowing annual imports of 283 thousand
tons of maize between 1920-33, the equivalent of 44 per cent of the
domestic harvest. The value of livestock output increased by 30 per cent
between 1909-13 and 1929-33.45
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Figure 3. Meat-Bread price ratio in Madrid and Paris, 1850-1930.
Note: 1848-52 = 1.005. Year averages have been used.
Source: Calculated from Singer-Kerel 1961, pp. 462-4 and Reher and Ballesteros
I993> PP- 139-42.
In theory, lower prices for bread, achieved through a more liberal tariff
policy, might have released more land for feed grains which could have been
diverted towards livestock produce. In reality, such a policy is likely to have
had limited results, and for two reasons. First, whereas the arrival of cheap
grain allowed a re-orientation of western European agriculture, the possibil-
ities in the Mediterranean countries, and Spain in particular, were much
44
 Flores de Lemus 1926. See also Jimenez Blanco 1986 and GEHR 1988, p. 61.
45
 Simpson 1995b, Table 2.
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less. On the secano, which covers about four fifths of Spain, natural
conditions were inappropriate for intensive livestock farming as practiced in
Europe prior to the second World War. Second, natural pastures were
notoriously poor, and artificial pastures virtually absent.46 Until the develop-
ment of intensive, stall feeding technologies, which could be adapted to
Mediterranean type climates, Spain's meat consumption would remain
low.
An alternative policy would have permitted free trade in both grains and
livestock produce, thereby hastening considerably the rural exodus. If this
alternative would have been regarded as far fetched by contemporaries in the
pre-Civil War period, evidence presented below suggests that the size of the
expected rural exodus would have been smaller than is often supposed.
4. Tariffs: an obstacle to off-farm migration?
The belief that tariff policy in Spain slowed the rural exodus is frequently
found in the literature.47 Likewise, it is argued that protection, in its various
forms, is essential to understanding why the area under cereals and legumes
increased by 1.47 million hectares, or 18.3 per cent, between 1886-90 and
1930-5.48 While there can be no question that farmers increased output in
response to favourable prices, or that the rural exodus would have been
faster if the government had not favoured the sector, a closer look at both
questions is required.
Between 1887 and 1910, the number of male workers in agriculture
increased by 16 per cent, from 4.0 millions to 4.7 millions; by contrast,
between 1910 and 1930 the figure fell by 18 per cent, to 3.8 millions.
Whereas between 1887 and 1910 agriculture accounted for about two thirds
of the active population, the figure in 1930 had fallen to 45 per cent. Recent
work by Sanchez Alonso suggests that emigration was weak before about
1904, but thereafter increased significantly. However, within a decade, the
main attraction for agricultural labour was Spain's rapidly growing cities.49
Sanchez Alonso argues that the main explanation to account for the rapid
increase in emigration after 1904 was the decline in the real level of
protection that cereal farmers enjoyed, on account of the strengthening of
the peseta.50 However, tariffs were increased across the board in 1906, and
46
 See especially Tortella 1994a, and Galassi 1986. In 1931 the area of artifical pastures in
Spain was 374 thousand hectares, or 2.4 per cent of the total. GEHR 1983a.
47
 Tortella 1987, p. 52, Prados de la Escosura 1988, p. 102 Sanchez Alonso 1995, pp.
184-5.
48
 GEHR 1983b.
49
 Between 1882 and 1904 Spain had a net emigration of just 185,000, compared to the
819,000 between 1904 and 1913. Between 1914 and 1930 there was a net return of
108,000. Sanchez Alonso 1995, pp. 45-7 and Table A3.6. See also Tortella 1987, p. 52
and Perez Moreda 1987, p. 36.
50
 GEHR 1980, p. 98 and Sanchez Alonso 1995, pp. 185-6.
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Tena has shown that agriculture was the sector that benefited most.51 Cereal
farmers would also benefit, as we have seen, from direct government price
intervention during the interwar period. Yet the years prior to the first World
War do appear to be a watershed, as not only does the rural exodus begin to
start in earnest, but this also marks the timing of a significant increase in the
area of cereals and legumes.
If tariffs encouraged an increase in cereal output, which under conditions
found in Spain implied an extension in the area cultivated,52 we might expect
population to be retained in agriculture in those areas which saw a growth in
the area cultivated, and released where there was no increase, or where it
was minimal. However, at first glance, Table 5 suggests this was not the
case. Between 1886-90 and 1902-12 the total area sown with cereals and
legumes declined slightly, whereas the labour force grew by 15 per cent. By
contrast, between 1902-12 and 1930-5 the area grew by 20 per cent while
the labour force fell by the same amount. Nevertheless, a closer look at
regional changes in the Table, together with a consideration of wider
changes that were taking place, allows us to learn more about the nature of
protection, and its impact on Spanish agriculture.
Between 1886-90 and 1902-12 the rural labour force grew faster in
precisely those areas where the area under cereals and legumes declined,
namely in the south of the country (La Mancha, eastern Andalucia and
Extremadura).53 This was caused, at least in part, by the increase in other
crops suitable to these regions, namely the olive (especially in eastern
Andalucia) and the vine (La Mancha). Nationally, output per male worker
stagnated between 1891-5 and 1909-13, caused by a combination of failing
to increase cereal output, switching resources more quickly into other higher
value crops, or mechanization.54 However, it would be difficult to argue, on
the basis of Table 5, that protection for cereal farmers was a significant
restraint to the rural exodus in this first period.
By contrast, the period between 1902-12 and 1930-5 does suggest that
cereal protection did play some role in determining the speed of the rural
exodus. Thus, with the exception of Castilla-Leon, off-farm migration was
fastest in those areas which saw the smallest growth in the area of cereals and
legumes. In the south of the country (Andalucia, La Mancha and Extrem-
adura), the area cultivated grew significantly, but the rural population fell
only very slightly. However, this poses a paradox, as it implies that in areas
of small farms (most notably Castilla-Leon) tariffs encouraged both an
extension in the area sown and a significant fall in farm population; by
51
 Tena forthcoming.
52
 For an explanation of why Spanish cereal farmers increased the area cultivated, as oppose
to trying to improve yields, see Simpson 1995a, pp. 119-24.
53
 Table 5 refers to areas of dry farming, and therefore excludes the northern provinces.
The choice of dates has been determined, at least in part, by the availability of sources.
54
 Output increased by just 12 per cent. Simpson 1995b, p. 200.
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Table 5. Changes in areas sown of cereals-legumes and rural
population.
(a) 1886/90-1902/12.
Western Andalucia
Castilla-Leon
Ebro valley
Pais Valenciano
Catalufia
La Mancha
Eastern Andalucia
Extremadura
SPAIN
(b) 1902/12-1930/5.
La Mancha
Extremadura
Castilla-Leon
Eastern Andalucia
Western Andalucia
Ebro valley
Catalufia
Pais Valenciano
SPAIN
% change in
sown
+ 13.0
+2.3
+ 1.9
-0-3
-2 .3
-12.4
-13.7
-11.3
- i - 3
% change in
area sown
+54-8
+29.1
+22.0
+20.9
+ 18.6
+ 18.1
+ 14.1
+ 8.0
+ 19.8
% change in
farm population
+4.8
+ 16.4
-0 .3
+23.6
+ 17.4
+20.3
+22.2
+ 15.8
+ 15.0
% change in
farm population
-3.6
-15-3
-35-3
-5-5
-0 .7
-19.1
-24.3
-28.0
-20.3
% total area
1902-12
8.4
23-3
10.2
5.6
5-9
14.1
9-4
11.6
88.5
% total area
1930
18.2
12.5
23.7
9-4
8.3
10.1
5.6
5-i
92.9
Notes: Farm population refers to male labour only.
Regions: Ebro valley (Alava, Huesca, Navarra, Rioja, Teruel and Zaragoza), La Mancha
(Albacete, Ciudad Real, Cuenca and Toledo), Extremadura (Badajoz, Caceres and
Salamanca); Western Andalucia (Cadiz, Cordoba, Huelva and Sevilla); Castilla-Leon
(Avila, Burgos, Guadalajara, Leon, Madrid, Palencia, Segovia, Soria, Valladolid and
Zamora); Pais Valenciano (Alicante, Castellon, Murcia and Valencia), Catalufia (Baleares,
Barcelona, Girona, Lleida and Tarragona) and Eastern Andalucia (Almeria, Jaen, Granada
and Malaga).
The Canary Islands and the north of Spain has been excluded, except for the total area of
cereals and legumes.
Sources: GEHR 1983b and Censos de poblacion.
contrast, it was in the areas of latifundios (large estates) and day labourers, in
the south of the country, where the extension in cultivation was accom-
panied by a growth in the labour force.55 To examine this paradox, we have
55
 See especially Bernal, 1985, pp. 243-8.
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to consider very briefly the political economy of tariffs, and the wider
determinants of migration.
In the face of low cereal prices, the choice of tariffs (or some other system
of price support), was just one potential policy option. In other countries,
such as Canada or France, agricultural policy was strongly influenced by the
interests of the family farmer, as reflected by the dominant role of cooper-
atives.56 In Spain, cooperatives appeared, especially after the first World
War, and helped the diffusion of new machinery and artificial fertilizers, but
they never seriously influenced government policy. The choice of an
agricultural policy based essentially on price intervention reflects the dis-
tribution of political power. Protection was the optimal policy choice for the
large cereal farmers, and Bernal has argued that the level of protection was
deliberately set so that the small family farms in Castilla-Leon, with
generally poorer quality land than in Andalucia, would remain profitable.57
However, for the family farm to remain viable, it was necessary to increase
the land:labour ratio and this was done, as reflected in Table 5, by both
expelling labour and increasing the area cultivated. As I have shown
elsewhere, it was in the areas of small farmers where the diffusion of the
reapers was fastest before the Civil War.58 The example of Castilla-Leon,
which accounted for 26 per cent of the increase in the area cultivated
between 1902-12 and 1930-35, and 27 per cent of the decline in the
agricultural labour force, suggests that a simple argument relating cereal
protection with restricting off-farm migration is incorrect. In the south by
contrast, the large estates benefited from cheap labour which frequently
made such mechanization unprofitable. Here the over-reliance on systems
of price support to maintain farm profitability delayed farm mechanization,
which in turn depressed productivity growth. Thus, whilst labour productiv-
ity in Castilla-Leon was 16 per cent greater than in Andalucia in 1909-13,
the difference had increased to 52 per cent by 1929-33.59 Yet the fact that
land:labour ratios in Andalucia were only approximately half those else-
where, and that wages and living conditions were notoriously poor even with
tariffs, suggests that something other than just the price of wheat was
determining the rate of off-farm migration.60 A policy which would have
allowed cereal prices to fall to levels such as those in England would no
56
 See, for example, the study by deary 1989, for France, and that by Solberg 1987, for
Canada.
57
 Bernal 1985, p. 261.
58
 Simpson 1995a, pp. 158-67.
59
 In Castilla-Leon, labour productivity grew by an annual 2.5 per cent beween 1910 and
1930, compared to only 1.1 per cent in Andalucia. Calculated from Simpson 1995b,
Table 7 and Appendix 2.
60
 In 1930, there were 5 hectares of cultivated land per male worker in Andalucia, compared
to about 10 hectares in the interior of the country. In the Mediterranean region, the
figure was 4 hectares, but this would include an important area of high value fruit trees
and irrigated land. Simpson 1995a, Table 10.2.
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doubt have reduced living standards even further in Andalucia, but would
not have done anything to have increased those other factors, such the
supply of information, education, potential access to land, etc., which are
often considered as helpful in encouraging rural labour to migrate. Even in
the south, tariffs are insufficient to explain the delay in the rural exodus.
Conclusion
The aim of this paper is to question the importance of tariffs, especially
those for cereals, in explaining the backward nature of Spanish agriculture.
Despite obvious changes in the economy, not least in the agricultural sector
itself, Spain was still a poor country in 1936. However, if diets were poor in
comparison to those in northern Europe, this was a characteristic that the
country shared with other Mediterranean countries. Yet if tariffs, and other
forms of price intervention, pushed prices higher than those on the inter-
national market, internal wheat prices in Spain were not so different from
those in France or Germany. By contrast, whereas farmers in these two
countries reacted to cheap imports both by protection and by switching
resources into other commodities, this did not happened to any great extent
in Spain. This was due not to the inefficiency of Spanish farmers, but rather
the limited market opportunities for alternative crops such as the vine and
olive, and the technical difficulties in introducing intensive livestock farming
systems in a country which suffered long summer droughts.
In the final section, I argue that tariffs and price intervention cannot explain
adequately the speed of the rural exodus. Between 1886-90 and 1902-12, a
period which saw the introduction of few labour-saving farm machines, the
regions which saw the biggest decline in cereals also experienced the biggest
increase in their farm populations. By contrast, the period between 1902-12
and 1930-5 shows a better correlation between changes in the area cropped
and the release of labour, suggesting perhaps that tariffs might have acted as a
brake on off-farm migration. However, nationally, the active population in
agriculture declined rapidly, from about two thirds in 1910, to 45 per cent in
1930, implying that at best the influence of tariffs must have been weak. More
importantly, within Spain itself, the response to price intervention was very
distinct. In Castilla-Leon, the policy appears to have been a stimulus to both
off-farm migration and technical change.61 By contrast, in the south, the size of
the labour force declined only slowly, but the area cropped increased.
If tariffs cannot be considered as the major factor in explaining the poor
performance of Spanish agriculture prior to the Civil War, what can?
Certainly natural resources were not favourable for the type of intensive
61
 In a different context, Clarke 1994, has argued that intervention by the government was
crucial in providing the necessary investment climate, so that farmers could take
advantages of the new technologies from the 1930s, which produced the rapid growth in
agricultural productivity in the United States.
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agriculture as increasingly found in northern Europe. But this type of
argument has only limited explanatory value, not least because natural
resources would not be any different in the 1960's when Spanish agriculture
started to modernize rapidly. The poverty and low productivity of the south
mentioned above highlights the failure of government policy. However, to
blame this on protection, and prescribe less government as being a better
alternative, also seems insufficient. Slow productivity growth was just as
much a question of the country's poor roads, its inefficient railways, the
limited area of irrigation, low investment in elementary schooling or in
developing new crops and plant strains, all of which would have required a
fundamental overhaul of the country's finances, and an active, not passive
role for the state. Whereas it is certainly true that tariffs, whether on
agricultural or industrial produce, were easy policy choices, they were also
political decisions, and therefore susceptible to the influence of pressure
groups.62 If Spanish farmers were not encouraged to switch out of cereals
because of the higher prices they received because of protection, more
serious was the failure of government to provide the lead in developing
alternative crops, or in investing in basic infrastructure.
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